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Abstract
Computers may help us to understand –not just verify– philosoph-
ical arguments. By utilizing modern proof assistants in an iterative in-
terpretive process, we can reconstruct and assess an argument by fully
formal means. Through the mechanization of a variant of St. Anselm’s
ontological argument by E. J. Lowe, which is a paradigmatic example
of a natural-language argument with strong ties to metaphysics and re-
ligion, we offer an ideal showcase for our computer-assisted interpretive
method.
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1 Embedding of Quantified Modal Logic
As is well known, the Isabelle proof assistant [10] does not natively sup-
port modal logics, so we have used a technique known as shallow semantic
embedding, which allows us to take advantage of the expressive power of
higher-order logic in order to embed the semantics of an object language.
We draw on previous work on the embedding of multimodal logics in HOL
[2], which has successfully been applied to the analysis and verification of
ontological arguments (e.g. [4, 3, 7]).
1.1 Type Declarations
typedecl e — Type for entities
typedecl w — Type for worlds
type-synonym wo = w⇒bool — Type for world-dependent formulas
1.2 Logical Constants as Truth-Sets
Using the technique of shallow semantic embedding each operator gets de-
fined as a function on world-dependent formulas or truth sets.
abbreviation mand ::wo⇒wo⇒wo (infixr ∧)
where ϕ∧ψ ≡ λw . (ϕ w)∧(ψ w)
abbreviation mor ::wo⇒wo⇒wo (infixr ∨)
where ϕ∨ψ ≡ λw . (ϕ w)∨(ψ w)
abbreviation mimp::wo⇒wo⇒wo (infixr →)
where ϕ→ψ ≡ λw . (ϕ w)−→(ψ w)
abbreviation mequ::wo⇒wo⇒wo (infix ↔)
where ϕ↔ψ ≡ λw . (ϕ w)←→(ψ w)
abbreviation mnot ::wo⇒wo (¬-)
where ¬ϕ ≡ λw . ¬(ϕ w)
We embed a modal logic K by defining the box and diamond operators
using restricted quantification over the set of ‘accessible’ worlds (using an
accessibility relation R as a guard).
consts R::w⇒w⇒bool (infix r) — Accessibility relation
abbreviation mbox :: wo⇒wo (-)
where ϕ ≡ λw .∀ v . (w r v)−→(ϕ v)
abbreviation mdia :: wo⇒wo (♦-)
where ♦ϕ ≡ λw .∃ v . (w r v)∧(ϕ v)
1.3 Quantification
Quantifiers are defined analogously.
abbreviation mforall ::( ′t⇒wo)⇒wo (∀ )
where ∀Φ ≡ λw .∀ x . (Φ x w)
abbreviation mexists::( ′t⇒wo)⇒wo (∃ )
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where ∃Φ ≡ λw .∃ x . (Φ x w)
abbreviation mforallB :: ( ′t⇒wo)⇒wo (binder ∀ )
where ∀ x . (ϕ x ) ≡ ∀ϕ
abbreviation mexistsB :: ( ′t⇒wo)⇒wo (binder ∃ )
where ∃ x . (ϕ x ) ≡ ∃ϕ
1.4 Equality
Two different definitions of equality are given. The first one is an extension
of standard equality for use in world-dependent formulas. The second is the
well-known Leibniz equality.
abbreviation meq :: ′t⇒ ′t⇒wo (infix ≈)
where x ≈ y ≡ λw . x = y
abbreviation meqL:: e⇒e⇒wo (infix ≈L)
where x ≈L y ≡ λw . ∀ϕ. (ϕ x w)−→(ϕ y w)
1.5 Validity
Validity is defined as truth in all worlds and represented by wrapping the
formula in special brackets (b−c).
abbreviation valid ::wo⇒bool (b-c) where bψc ≡ ∀w .(ψ w)
1.6 Verifying the Embedding
The above definitions introduce modal logic K with quantification, as evi-
denced by the following tests.
lemma K : b((ϕ → ψ)) → (ϕ → ψ)c by simp — Verifying K principle
lemma NEC : bϕc =⇒ bϕc by simp — Verifying necessitation rule
Local consequence implies global consequence (not the other way round).
lemma localImpGlobalCons: bϕ → ξc =⇒ bϕc −→ bξc by simp
lemma bϕc −→ bξc =⇒ bϕ → ξc nitpick oops — Countersatisfiable
(Converse-)Barcan formulas are validated in this embedding.
lemma b(∀ x .(ϕ x )) → (∀ x .(ϕ x ))c by simp
lemma b(∀ x .(ϕ x )) → (∀ x .(ϕ x ))c by simp
β-redex is valid.
lemma b(λα. ϕ α) (τ ::w⇒e) ↔ (ϕ τ)c by simp
lemma b(λα. ϕ α) (τ ::e) ↔ (ϕ τ)c by simp
lemma b(λα. ϕ α) (τ ::w⇒e) ↔ (ϕ τ)c by simp
lemma b(λα. ϕ α) (τ ::e) ↔ (ϕ τ)c by simp
Modal collapse is countersatisfiable, as shown by Nitpick [6].
lemma bϕ → ϕc nitpick oops
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1.7 Axiomatization of Further Logics
The best-known normal logics (K4, K5, KB, K45, KB5, D, D4, D5, ...) can
be obtained by combinations of the following axioms.
abbreviation T where T ≡ ∀ϕ. ϕ → ϕ
abbreviation B where B ≡ ∀ϕ. ϕ → ♦ϕ
abbreviation D where D ≡ ∀ϕ. ϕ → ♦ϕ
abbreviation IV where IV ≡ ∀ϕ. ϕ → ϕ
abbreviation V where V ≡ ∀ϕ. ♦ϕ → ♦ϕ
Instead of postulating combinations of the above axioms we make use of the
well-known Sahlqvist correspondence, which links axioms to constraints on
a model’s accessibility relation (cf. [2] for further details). We show that
reflexivity, symmetry, seriality, transitivity and euclideanness imply axioms
T, B, D, IV, V respectively.1
lemma reflexive R =⇒ bTc by blast
lemma symmetric R =⇒ bBc by blast
lemma serial R =⇒ bDc by blast
lemma transitive R =⇒ bIV c by blast
lemma euclidean R =⇒ bV c by blast
lemma preorder R =⇒ bTc ∧ bIV c by blast — S4: reflexive + transitive
lemma equivalence R =⇒ bTc ∧ bV c by blast — S5: preorder + symmetric
2 E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument
2.1 Introduction
E. J. Lowe presented his argument in an article named ”A Modal Version
of the Ontological Argument”, which has been published as a chapter in
[9]. The structure of this argument is very representative of philosophical
arguments. It features eight premises from which new inferences are drawn
until arriving at a final conclusion: the necessary existence of God (which in
this case amounts to the existence of some ”necessary concrete being”).
(P1) God is, by definition, a necessary concrete being.
(P2) Some necessary abstract beings exist.
(P3) All abstract beings are dependent beings.
(P4) All dependent beings depend for their existence on independent beings.
(P5) No contingent being can explain the existence of a necessary being.
1Implication can also be proven in the reverse direction (which is not needed for our
purposes). Using these definitions, we can derive axioms for the most common modal
logics (see also [1]). Thereby we are free to use either the semantic constraints or the
related Sahlqvist axioms. Here we provide both versions. In what follows we use the
semantic constraints for improved performance.
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(P6) The existence of any dependent being needs to be explained.
(P7) Dependent beings of any kind cannot explain their own existence.
(P8) The existence of dependent beings can only be explained by beings on
which they depend for their existence.
We will consider in our treatment only a representative subset of the con-
clusions, as presented in Lowe’s article.
(C1) All abstract beings depend for their existence on concrete beings. (Fol-
lows from P3 and P4 together with D3 and D4.)
(C5) In every possible world there exist concrete beings. (Follows from C1
and P2.)
(C7) The existence of necessary abstract beings needs to be explained. (Fol-
lows from P2, P3 and P6.)
(C8) The existence of necessary abstract beings can only be explained by
concrete beings. (Follows from C1, P3, P7 and P8.)
(C9) The existence of necessary abstract beings is explained by one or more
necessary concrete beings. (Follows from C7, C8 and P5.)
(C10) A necessary concrete being exists. (Follows from C9.)
Lowe also introduces some informal definitions which should help the reader
understand the meaning of the concepts involved in his argument (necessity,
concreteness, ontological dependence, metaphysical explanation, etc.). In
the following discussion, we will see that most of these definitions do not
bear the significance Lowe claims.
(D1) x is a necessary being := x exists in every possible world.
(D2) x is a contingent being := x exists in some but not every possible world.
(D3) x is a concrete being := x exists in space and time, or at least in time.
(D4) x is an abstract being := x does not exist in space or time.
(D5) x depends for its existence on y := necessarily, x exists only if y exists.
(D6) (For any predicates F and G) F depend for their existence on G :=
necessarily, Fs exist only if Gs exist.
We will work iteratively on Lowe’s argument by temporarily fixing truth-
values and inferential relationships among its sentences, and then, after
choosing a logic for formalization, working back and forth on the formal-
ization of its axioms and theorems by making gradual adjustments while
getting automatic real-time feedback about the suitability of our changes,
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vis-a-vis the argument’s validity. In this fashion, by engaging in an iterative
process of trial and error, we work our way towards a proper understand-
ing of the concepts involved in the argument, far beyond of what a mere
natural-language based discussion would allow.
2.2 Initial Formalization
We start our first iterations with a formalized version of Lowe’s argument in
modal logic using the semantic embedding presented in the previous section.
We first turn to the formalization of premise P1: ”God is, by definition, a
necessary concrete being”. In order to understand the concept of necessari-
ness (i.e. being a ”necessary being”) employed in this argument, we have
a look at the definitions D1 and D2 provided by Lowe. They relate the
concepts of necessariness and contingency (i.e. being a ”contingent being”)
with existence:2
(D1) x is a necessary being := x exists in every possible world.
(D2) x is a contingent being := x exists in some but not every possible world.
The two definitions above, aimed at explicating the concepts of necessari-
ness and contingency by reducing them to existence and quantification over
possible worlds, have a direct impact on the choice of a logic for formaliza-
tion. They not only call for some kind of modal logic with possible-world
semantics but also lead us to consider the complex issue of existence, since
we need to restrict the domain of quantification at every world.
For this argument not to become trivialized, we guarded our quantifiers
so they range only over those entities existing (i.e. being actualized) at a
given world. This approach is known as actualist quantification and is im-
plemented in our semantic embedding by defining a world-dependent meta-
logical ‘existence’ predicate (called ”actualizedAt” below), which is the one
used as a guard in the definition of the quantifiers. Note that the type e
characterizes the domain of all beings (existing and non-existing), and the
type wo (which is an abbreviation for w⇒bool) characterizes sets of worlds.
The term ”isActualized” thus relates beings to worlds.
consts isActualized ::e⇒wo (infix actualizedAt)
abbreviation forallAct ::(e⇒wo)⇒wo (∀ A)
where ∀ AΦ ≡ λw .∀ x . (x actualizedAt w)−→(Φ x w)
abbreviation existsAct ::(e⇒wo)⇒wo (∃ A)
where ∃ AΦ ≡ λw .∃ x . (x actualizedAt w) ∧ (Φ x w)
2 Here, the concepts of necessariness and contingency are meant as properties of beings,
in contrast to the concepts of necessity and possibility which are modals. We will see later
how both pairs of concepts can be related in order to validate this argument.
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We also define the corresponding binder syntax below.
abbreviation mforallActB ::(e⇒wo)⇒wo (binder∀ A[8 ]9 )
where ∀ Ax . (ϕ x ) ≡ ∀ Aϕ
abbreviation mexistsActB ::(e⇒wo)⇒wo (binder∃ A[8 ]9 )
where ∃ Ax . (ϕ x ) ≡ ∃ Aϕ
We use Isabelle’s Nitpick tool [6] to verify that actualist quantification val-
idates neither the Barcan formula nor its converse.
lemma b(∀ Ax . (ϕ x )) → (∀ Ax . ϕ x )c
nitpick oops — Countermodel found: formula not valid
lemma b(∀ Ax . ϕ x ) → (∀ Ax . (ϕ x ))c
nitpick oops — Countermodel found: formula not valid
With actualist quantification in place we can: (i) formalize the concept of
existence in the usual form (by using a restricted particular quantifier), (ii)
formalize necessariness as existing necessarily, and (iii) formalize contingency
as existing possibly but not necessarily.
definition Existence::e⇒wo (E !) where E ! x ≡ ∃ Ay . y ≈ x
definition Necessary ::e⇒wo where Necessary x ≡ E ! x
definition Contingent ::e⇒wo where Contingent x≡ ♦E ! x ∧ ¬Necessary x
Note that we have just chosen our logic for formalization: a free quantified
modal logic K with positive semantics. The logic is free because the domain
of quantification (for actualist quantifiers) is a proper subset of our universe
of discourse, so we can refer to non-actual objects. The semantics is positive
because we have placed no restriction regarding predication on non-actual
objects, so they are also allowed to exemplify properties and relations. We
are also in a position to embed stronger normal modal logics (KB, KB5, S4,
S5, ...) by restricting the accessibility relation R with additional axioms.
Having chosen our logic, we can now turn to the formalization of the concepts
of abstractness and concreteness. As seen previously, Lowe has already
provided us with an explication of these concepts:
(D3) x is a concrete being := x exists in space and time, or at least in time.
(D4) x is an abstract being := x does not exist in space or time.
Lowe himself acknowledges that the explication of these concepts in terms
of existence ”in space and time” is superfluous, since we are only interested
in them being complementary.3 Thus we start by formalizing concreteness
3 We quote from Lowe’s original article: ”Observe that, according to these definitions,
a being cannot be both concrete and abstract: being concrete and being abstract are
mutually exclusive properties of beings. Also, all beings are either concrete or abstract ...
the abstract/concrete distinction is exhaustive. Consequently, a being is concrete if and
only if it is not abstract.”
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as a primitive world-dependent predicate and then derive abstractness from
it, namely as its negation.
consts Concrete::e⇒wo
abbreviation Abstract ::e⇒wo where Abstract x ≡ ¬(Concrete x )
We can now formalize the definition of Godlikeness (P1) as follows:
abbreviation Godlike::e⇒wo where Godlike x ≡ Necessary x ∧ Concrete x
We also formalize premise P2 (”Some necessary abstract beings exist”) as
shown below:
axiomatization where
P2 : b∃ Ax . Necessary x ∧ Abstract xc
Let’s now turn to premises P3 (”All abstract beings are dependent beings”)
and P4 (”All dependent beings depend for their existence on independent
beings”). We have here three new concepts to be explicated: two predicates
”dependent” and ”independent” and a relation ”depends (for its existence)
on”, which has been called ontological dependence by Lowe. Following our
linguistic intuitions concerning their interrelation, we start by proposing the
following formalization:
consts dependence::e⇒e⇒wo (infix dependsOn)
definition Dependent ::e⇒wo where Dependent x ≡ ∃ Ay . x dependsOn y
abbreviation Independent ::e⇒wo where Independent x ≡ ¬(Dependent x )
We have formalized ontological dependence as a primitive world-dependent
relation and refrained from any explication (as suggested by Lowe).4
We have called an entity dependent if and only if there actually exists an
object y such that x depends for its existence on it; accordingly, we have
called an entity independent if and only if it is not dependent.
As a consequence, premises P3 (”All abstract beings are dependent beings”)
and P4 (”All dependent beings depend for their existence on independent
beings”) become formalized as follows.
axiomatization where
P3 : b∀ Ax . Abstract x → Dependent xc and
P4 : b∀ Ax . Dependent x → (∃ Ay . Independent y ∧ x dependsOn y)c
4 An explication of this concept has been suggested by Lowe in definition D5 (”x
depends for its existence on y := necessarily, x exists only if y exists”). Concerning this
alleged definition, he has written in a footnote to the same article: ”Note, however, that the
two definitions (D5) and (D6) presented below are not in fact formally called upon in the
version of the ontological argument that I am now developing, so that in the remainder of
this chapter the notion of existential dependence may, for all intents and purposes, be taken
as primitive. There is an advantage in this, inasmuch as finding a perfectly apt definition
of existential dependence is no easy task, as I explain in ‘Ontological Dependence.’” Lowe
refers hereby to his article on ontological dependence in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [8] for further discussion.
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Concerning premises P5 (”No contingent being can explain the existence of
a necessary being”) and P6 (”The existence of any dependent being needs
to be explained”), a suitable formalization for expressions of the form: ”the
entity X explains the existence of Y” and ”the existence of X is explained”
needs to be found. These expressions rely on a single binary relation, which
will initially be taken as primitive. This relation has been called metaphysical
explanation by Lowe.
consts explanation::e⇒e⇒wo (infix explains)
definition Explained ::e⇒wo where Explained x ≡ ∃ Ay . y explains x
axiomatization where
P5 : b¬(∃ Ax . ∃ Ay . Contingent y ∧ Necessary x ∧ y explains x )c
Premise P6, together with the last two premises: P7 (”Dependent beings of
any kind cannot explain their own existence”) and P8 (”The existence of
dependent beings can only be explained by beings on which they depend for
their existence”), were introduced by Lowe in order to relate the concept of
metaphysical explanation to ontological dependence.5
axiomatization where
P6 : b∀ x . Dependent x → Explained xc and
P7 : b∀ x . Dependent x → ¬(x explains x )c and
P8 : b∀ x y . y explains x → x dependsOn yc
Although the last three premises seem to couple very tightly the concepts
of (metaphysical) explanation and (ontological) dependence, both concepts
are not meant by Lowe to be equivalent.6 We have used Nitpick in order
to test this claim. Since a countermodel has been found, we have proven
that the (inverse) equivalence of metaphysical explanation and ontological
dependence is not implied by the axioms.
lemma b∀ x y . x explains y ↔ y dependsOn xc nitpick[user-axioms] oops
For any being, however, having its existence ”explained” is equivalent to its
existence being ”dependent” (on some other being). This follows already
from premises P6 and P8, as shown above by Isabelle’s prover.
lemma b∀ x . Explained x ↔ Dependent xc
using P6 P8 Dependent-def Explained-def by auto
The Nitpick model finder is also useful to check axioms consistency at any
stage during the formalization of an argument. We instruct Nitpick to gen-
5Note that we use non-guarded quantifiers for the formalization of the last three
premises in order to test argument’s validity under the strongest assumptions. As be-
fore, we turn a blind eye to modal expressions like ”can”, ”needs to”, etc.
6 Lowe says: ”Existence-explanation is not simply the inverse of existential dependence.
If x depends for its existence on y, this only means that x cannot exist without y existing.
This is not at all the same as saying that x exists because y exists, or that x exists in
virtue of the fact that y exists.”
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erate a model satisfying some tautological sentence (here we use a trivial
‘True’ proposition) while taking into account all previously defined axioms.
lemma True nitpick[satisfy , user-axioms] oops
In this case, Nitpick was able to find a model satisfying the given tautology;
this means that all axioms defined so far are consistent. The model found
has a cardinality of two for the set of individual objects and a single world.
We can also use model finders to perform ‘sanity checks’. We can instruct
Nitpick to find a countermodel for some specifically tailored formula which
we want to make sure is not valid. We check below, for instance, that
our axioms are not too strong as to imply metaphysical necessitism (i.e.
all beings necessarily exist) or modal collapse. Since both would trivially
validate the argument.
lemma b∀ x . E ! xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found: necessitism is not valid
lemma bϕ → ϕc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found: modal collapse is not valid
By using Isabelle’s Sledgehammer tool [5], we can verify the validity of the
selected conclusions C1, C5 and C7, and even find the premises they rely
upon.
(C1) All abstract beings depend for their existence on concrete beings.
theorem C1 : b∀ Ax . Abstract x → (∃ y . Concrete y ∧ x dependsOn y)c
using P3 P4 by blast
(C5) In every possible world there exist concrete beings.
theorem C5 : b∃ Ax . Concrete xc
using P2 P3 P4 by blast
(C7) The existence of necessary abstract beings needs to be explained.
theorem C7 : b∀ Ax . (Necessary x ∧ Abstract x ) → Explained xc
using P3 P6 by simp
The last three conclusions are shown by Nitpick to be non-valid even in an
S5 logic. S5 can be easily introduced by postulating that the accessibility
relation R is an equivalence relation. This exploits the well-known Sahlqvist
correspondence which links modal axioms to constraints on a model’s acces-
sibility relation.
axiomatization where
S5 : equivalence R — ϕ→ϕ, ϕ→♦ϕ and ϕ→ϕ
(C8) The existence of necessary abstract beings can only be explained by
concrete beings.
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lemma C8 : b∀ Ax .(Necessary x ∧ Abstract x )→(∀ Ay . y explains x→Concrete y)c
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
(C9) The existence of necessary abstract beings is explained by one or more
necessary concrete (Godlike) beings.
lemma C9 : b∀ Ax .(Necessary x ∧ Abstract x )→(∃ Ay . y explains x ∧ Godlike y)c
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
(C10) A necessary concrete (Godlike) being exists.
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
By employing the Isabelle proof assistant we prove non-valid a first formal-
ization attempt of Lowe’s modal ontological argument. This is, however,
just the first of many iterations in our interpretive endeavor. Based on the
information recollected so far, we can proceed to make the adjustments nec-
essary to validate the argument. We will see how these changes have an
impact on our understanding of all concepts (necessariness, concreteness,
dependence, explanation, etc.).
2.3 Validating the Argument I
By examining the countermodel found by Nitpick for C10 we can see that
some necessary beings that are abstract in the actual world may indeed be
concrete in other accessible worlds. Lowe had previously presented numbers
as an example of such necessary abstract beings. It can be argued that
numbers, while existing necessarily, can never be concrete in any possible
world, so we add the restriction of abstractness being an essential property,
i.e. a locally rigid predicate.
axiomatization where
abstractness-essential : b∀ x . Abstract x → Abstract xc
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
As Nitpick shows us, the former restriction is not enough to prove C10.
We try postulating further restrictions on the accessibility relation R which,
taken together, would amount to it being an equivalence relation. Following
the Sahlqvist correspondence, this would make for a modal logic S5, and our
abstractness property would consequently become a (globally) rigid predi-
cate.
axiomatization where
T-axiom: reflexive R and — ϕ → ϕ
B-axiom: symmetric R and — ϕ → ♦ϕ
IV-axiom: transitive R — ϕ → ϕ
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theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
By examining the new countermodel found by Nitpick we notice that at
some worlds there are non-existent concrete beings. We want to disallow
this possibility, so we make concreteness an existence-entailing property.
axiomatization where concrete-exist : b∀ x . Concrete x → E ! xc
We carry out the usual ‘sanity checks’ to make sure the argument has not
become trivialized.7
lemma True
nitpick[satisfy , user-axioms] oops — Model found: axioms are consistent
lemma b∀ x . E ! xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found: necessitism is not valid
lemma bϕ → ϕc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found: modal collapse is not valid
Since this time Nitpick was not able to find a countermodel for C10, we
have enough confidence in the validity of the formula to ask Sledgehammer
to search for a proof.
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc using Existence-def Necessary-def
abstractness-essential concrete-exist P2 C1 B-axiom by meson
Sledgehammer is able to find a proof relying on all premises but the two
modal axioms T and IV. By the end of this iteration we see that Lowe’s
modal ontological argument depends for its validity on three non-stated (i.e.
implicit) premises: the essentiality of abstractness, the existence-entailing
nature of concreteness and the modal axiom B (ϕ → ♦ϕ). Moreover, we
have also shed some light on the meaning of the concepts of abstractness
and concreteness.
2.4 Validating the Argument II
We present a slightly simplified version of the original argument (without the
implicit premises stated in the previous version). In this variant premises
P1 to P5 remain unchanged and none of the last three premises proposed
by Lowe (P6 to P8) show up anymore. Those last premises have been intro-
duced in order to interrelate the concepts of explanation and dependence in
such a way that they play somewhat opposite roles. Now we want to go all
the way and simply assume that they are inverse relations, for we want to
understand how the interrelation of these two concepts affects the validity
of the argument.
7 These checks are being carried out after postulating axioms for every iteration, so we
won’t mention them anymore.
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axiomatization where
dep-expl-inverse: b∀ x y . y explains x ↔ x dependsOn yc
We proceed to prove the relevant partial conclusions.
theorem C1 : b∀ Ax . Abstract x → (∃ y . Concrete y ∧ x dependsOn y)c
using P3 P4 by blast
theorem C5 : b∃ Ax . Concrete xc
using P2 P3 P4 by blast
theorem C7 : b∀ Ax . (Necessary x ∧ Abstract x ) → Explained xc
using Explained-def P3 P4 dep-expl-inverse by meson
But the final conclusion C10 is still countersatisfiable, as shown by Nitpick:
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc
nitpick[user-axioms] oops — Countermodel found
Next, we try assuming a stronger modal logic. We do this by postulating
further axioms using the Sahlqvist correspondence and asking Sledgehammer
to find a proof. Sledgehammer is in fact able to find a proof for C10 which
only relies on the modal axiom T (ϕ → ϕ).
axiomatization where
T-axiom: reflexive R and — ϕ → ϕ
B-axiom: symmetric R and — ϕ → ♦ϕ
IV-axiom: transitive R — ϕ → ϕ
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc using Contingent-def Existence-def
P2 P3 P4 P5 dep-expl-inverse T-axiom by meson
In this series of iterations we have verified a modified version of the original
argument by Lowe. Our understanding of the concepts of ontological depen-
dence and metaphysical explanation have changed after the introduction of
an additional axiom constraining both: they are now inverse relations. Still,
we want to carry on with our iterative process in order to further illuminate
the meaning of the concepts involved in this argument.
2.5 Simplifying the Argument
After some further iterations we arrive at a new variant of the original ar-
gument: Premises P1 to P4 remain unchanged and a new premise D5 (”x
depends for its existence on y := necessarily, x exists only if y exists”) is
added. D5 corresponds to the ‘definition’ of ontological dependence as put
forth by Lowe in his article (though just for illustrative purposes). As men-
tioned before, this purported definition was never meant by him to become
part of the argument. Nevertheless, we show here how, by assuming the
left-to-right direction of this definition, we get in a position to prove the
main conclusions without any further assumptions.
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axiomatization where
D5 : b∀ Ax y . x dependsOn y → (E ! x → E ! y)c
theorem C1 : b∀ Ax . Abstract x → (∃ y . Concrete y ∧ x dependsOn y)c
using P3 P4 by meson
theorem C5 : b∃ Ax . Concrete xc
using P2 P3 P4 by meson
theorem C10 : b∃ Ax . Godlike xc
using Necessary-def P2 P3 P4 D5 by meson
In this variant we have been able to verify the conclusion of the argument
without appealing to the concept of metaphysical explanation. We were able
to get by with just the concept of ontological dependence by explicating it
in terms of existence and necessity (as suggested by Lowe).
As a side note, we can also prove that the original premise P5 (”No contin-
gent being can explain the existence of a necessary being”) directly follows
from D5 by redefining metaphysical explanation as the inverse relation of
ontological dependence.
abbreviation explanation::(e⇒e⇒wo) (infix explains)
where y explains x ≡ x dependsOn y
lemma P5 : b¬(∃ Ax . ∃ Ay . Contingent y ∧ Necessary x ∧ y explains x )c
using Necessary-def Contingent-def D5 by meson
In this series of iterations we have reworked the argument so as to get rid of
the somewhat obscure concept of metaphysical explanation; we also got some
insight into Lowe’s concept of ontological dependence vis-a-vis its inferential
role in this argument.
There are still some interesting issues to consider. Note that the defini-
tions of existence (Existence-def ) and being ”dependent” (Dependent-def )
are not needed in any of the highly optimized proofs found by our automated
tools. This raises some suspicions concerning the role played by the exis-
tence predicate in the definitions of necessariness and contingency, as well as
putting into question the need for a definition of being ”dependent” linked
to the ontological dependence relation. We will see in the following section
that our suspicions are justified and that this argument can be dramatically
simplified.
2.6 Arriving at a Non-Modal Argument
A new simplified emendation of Lowe’s argument is obtained after abandon-
ing the concept of existence and redefining necessariness and contingency
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accordingly. As we will see, this variant is actually non-modal and can be
easily formalized in first-order predicate logic.
A more literal reading of Lowe’s article has suggested a simplified formal-
ization, in which necessariness and contingency are taken as complementary
predicates. According to this, our domain of discourse becomes divided in
four main categories, as exemplified in the table below:8
Abstract Concrete
Necessary Numbers God
Contingent Fiction Stuff
consts Necessary ::e⇒wo
abbreviation Contingent ::e⇒wo where Contingent x ≡ ¬(Necessary x )
consts Concrete::e⇒wo
abbreviation Abstract ::e⇒wo where Abstract x ≡ ¬(Concrete x )
abbreviation Godlike::e⇒w⇒bool where Godlike x≡ Necessary x ∧ Concrete x
consts dependence::e⇒e⇒wo (infix dependsOn)
abbreviation explanation::(e⇒e⇒wo) (infix explains)
where y explains x ≡ x dependsOn y
As shown below, we can even define the ”dependent” predicate as primitive,
i.e. bearing no relation to ontological dependence, and still be able to vali-
date the argument. Being ”independent” is defined as the negation of being
”dependent”, as before.
consts Dependent ::e⇒wo
abbreviation Independent ::e⇒wo where Independent x ≡ ¬(Dependent x )
By taking, once again, metaphysical explanation as the inverse relation of
ontological dependence and by assuming premises P2 to P5 we can prove
conclusion C10.
axiomatization where
P2 : b∃ x . Necessary x ∧ Abstract xc and
P3 : b∀ x . Abstract x → Dependent xc and
P4 : b∀ x . Dependent x → (∃ y . Independent y ∧ x dependsOn y)c and
P5 : b¬(∃ x . ∃ y . Contingent y ∧ Necessary x ∧ y explains x )c
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc using P2 P3 P4 P5 by blast
Note that, in the axioms above, all actualist quantifiers have been changed
into non-guarded quantifiers, following the elimination of the concept of
8 As Lowe explains in the article, ”there is no logical restriction on combinations of the
properties involved in the concrete/abstract and the necessary/contingent distinctions.
In principle, then, we can have contingent concrete beings, contingent abstract beings,
necessary concrete beings, and necessary abstract beings.”
15
existence from our argument: Our quantifiers range over all beings, because
all beings exist. Also note that all modal operators have disappeared; thus,
this new variant is directly formalizable in classical first-order logic.
2.7 Modified Modal Argument I
In the following iterations we want to illustrate an approach in which we
start our interpretive endeavor with no pre-understanding of the concepts
involved. We start by taking all concepts as primitive without providing
any definition or presupposing any interrelation between them. We see how
we gradually improve our understanding of these concepts in the iterative
process of adding and removing axioms and, therefore, by framing their
inferential role in the argument.
consts Concrete::e⇒wo
consts Abstract ::e⇒wo
consts Necessary ::e⇒wo
consts Contingent ::e⇒wo
consts dependence::e⇒e⇒wo (infix dependsOn)
consts explanation::e⇒e⇒wo (infix explains)
consts Dependent ::e⇒wo
abbreviation Independent ::e⇒wo where Independent x ≡ ¬(Dependent x )
In order to honor the original intention of the author, i.e. providing a modal
variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument, we are required to make a
change in Lowe’s original formulation. In this variant we have restated the
expressions ”necessary abstract” and ”necessary concrete” as ”necessarily
abstract” and ”necessarily concrete” correspondingly. With this new adver-
bial reading of the former ”necessary” predicate we are no longer talking
about the concept of necessariness, but of necessity instead, so we use the
modal box operator () for its formalization. Note that in this variant we
are not concerned with the interpretation of the original ontological argu-
ment anymore. We are interested, instead, in showing how our method can
go beyond simple interpretation and foster a creative approach to assessing
and improving philosophical arguments.
Premise P1 now reads: ”God is, by definition, a necessarily concrete being.”
abbreviation Godlike::e⇒wo where Godlike x ≡ Concrete x
Premise P2 reads: ”Some necessarily abstract beings exist”. The rest of the
premises remains unchanged.
axiomatization where
P2 : b∃ x . Abstract xc and
P3 : b∀ x . Abstract x → Dependent xc and
P4 : b∀ x . Dependent x → (∃ y . Independent y ∧ x dependsOn y)c and
P5 : b¬(∃ x . ∃ y . Contingent y ∧ Necessary x ∧ y explains x )c
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Without postulating any additional axioms, C10 (”A necessarily concrete
being exists”) can be falsified by Nitpick.
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc
nitpick oops — Countermodel found
An explication of the concepts of necessariness, contingency and explanation
is provided below by axiomatizing their interrelation to other concepts. We
regard necessariness as being necessarily abstract or necessarily concrete.
We regard explanation as the inverse relation of dependence, as before.
axiomatization where
Necessary-expl : b∀ x . Necessary x ↔ (Abstract x ∨ Concrete x )c and
Contingent-expl : b∀ x . Contingent x ↔ ¬Necessary xc and
Explanation-expl : b∀ x y . y explains x ↔ x dependsOn yc
Without any further constraints, C10 becomes falsified by Nitpick.
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc
nitpick oops — Countermodel found
We postulate further modal axioms (using the Sahlqvist correspondence)
and ask Isabelle’s Sledgehammer for a proof. Sledgehammer is able to find
a proof for C10 which only relies on the modal axiom T (ϕ → ϕ).
axiomatization where
T-axiom: reflexive R and — ϕ → ϕ
B-axiom: symmetric R and — ϕ → ♦ϕ
IV-axiom: transitive R — ϕ → ϕ
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc using Contingent-expl Explanation-expl
Necessary-expl P2 P3 P4 P5 T-axiom by metis
2.8 Modified Modal Argument II
We start again our interpretive process with no pre-understanding of the
concepts involved (by taking them as primitive). We then see how their
inferential role gradually becomes apparent in the process of axiomatizing
further constraints. We follow on with the adverbial reading of the expres-
sion ”necessary” as in the previous version.
Another explication of the concepts of necessariness and contingency is pro-
vided below. We think that this explication, in comparison to the previous
one, better fits our intuitive understanding of necessariness. We now regard
necessariness as being necessarily abstract or concrete, and explanation as
the inverse relation of dependence, as before.
axiomatization where
Necessary-expl : b∀ x . Necessary x ↔ (Abstract x ∨ Concrete x )c and
Contingent-expl : b∀ x . Contingent x ↔ ¬Necessary xc and
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Explanation-expl : b∀ x y . y explains x ↔ x dependsOn yc
These constraints are, however, not enough to ensure the argument’s validity
as confirmed by Nitpick.
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc
nitpick oops — Countermodel found
After some iterations, we see that, by giving a more satisfactory explication
of the concept of necesariness, we are also required to assume the essentiality
of abstractness (as we did in a former iteration) and to restrict the acces-
sibility relation by enforcing its symmetry (i.e. assuming the modal axiom
B).
axiomatization where
abstractness-essential : b∀ x . Abstract x → Abstract xc and
B-Axiom: symmetric R
theorem C10 : b∃ x . Godlike xc using Contingent-expl Explanation-expl
Necessary-expl P2 P3 P4 P5 abstractness-essential B-Axiom by metis
We have chosen to terminate, after this series of iterations, our interpretive
endeavor. In each of the previous versions we have illustrated how our under-
standing of the concepts of necessity/contingency, explanation/dependence
and abstractness/concreteness has gradually evolved thanks to the kind of
iterative hypothetico-deductive method which has been made possible by
the real-time feedback provided by Isabelle’s automated proving tools.
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